Factors of Influence on the Stability of Strategic Alliances
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INTRODUCTION 8
CHAPTER 1. STABILITY IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 13
1.1 Strategic alliances as a form of cooperation 13
1.2 Explaining strategic alliance success 17
1.3 Strategic alliance stability in academic literature 20
1.4 Strategic alliance stability conceptualization 28
1.5 Factors of strategic alliance stability: theoretical perspectives 32
1.6 Chapter 1 concluding remarks 37
CHAPTER 2. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE STABILITY FACTORS HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY 39
2.1 Strategic alliance stability factors and hypotheses 39
2.2 Data collection: resources and restrictions 46
2.3 Chapter 2 concluding remarks 53
CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL STUDY ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCE STABILITY
FACTORS 55
3.1 Data analysis and measurements 55
3.2 Measurement model development and assessment 58
3.3 Structural model specification and assessment 68
3.4 Modeling results and analysis 72
3.5 Chapter 3 concluding remarks 78
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 80
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 84
LIST OF REFERENCES 86
APPENDICES
CHAPTER 1. STABILITY IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 13
1.1 Strategic alliances as a form of cooperation 13
1.2 Explaining strategic alliance success 17
1.3 Strategic alliance stability in academic literature 20
1.4 Strategic alliance stability conceptualization 28
1.5 Factors of strategic alliance stability: theoretical perspectives 32
1.6 Chapter 1 concluding remarks 37
CHAPTER 2. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE STABILITY FACTORS HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY 39
2.1 Strategic alliance stability factors and hypotheses 39
2.2 Data collection: resources and restrictions 46
2.3 Chapter 2 concluding remarks 53
CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL STUDY ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCE STABILITY
FACTORS 55
3.1 Data analysis and measurements 55
3.2 Measurement model development and assessment 58
3.3 Structural model specification and assessment 68
3.4 Modeling results and analysis 72
3.5 Chapter 3 concluding remarks 78
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 80
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 84
LIST OF REFERENCES 86
APPENDICES
Research background. The last 50 years have shown an immense growth in emergence of strategic alliances. Hence, the attention of researchers and practitioners to this issue has been increasing (Christoffersen, 2013). The growth of the number of strategic alliances was especially noticeable starting from the 80s, which corresponded to the growing relational and institutional complexity of managing these forms of collaboration. Strategic alliances are widely recognized to be a helpful form on inter-organizational relationships that aids firms in standing against the competition in a complex business environment (Akkaya, 2007) and in creating customer value (Iyer, 2002; Umukoroa, Sulaimonb, Kuyeb, 2009). However, some scholars estimate the failure rate of strategic alliances to mount to 60-65% due to unmet objectives, failed expectations or other reasons (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Umukoroa, Sulaimonb, Kuyeb, 2009; Gibbs, Humphries, 2016). At the same time, growing competition, raising research and development costs, shortening product life cycles lead to a new surge in emergence of strategic alliances (Gibbs, Humphries, 2016).
Academic studies on strategic alliances have been carried out for at least 50 years with the past 30 years being the most intense (Umukoroa, Sulaimonb and Kuyeb, 2009). The earliest studies on strategic alliances include (Friedmann and Kalmanoff, 1961; Franko, 1971). With the passage of time, along with strategic alliances growing prevalence, the studies on strategic alliances were progressing from the most broad to increasingly specific, addressing specific types of alliances (e.g., joint ventures, international joint ventures, non-equity alliances, international strategic alliances) and specific issues in alliances (e.g., motivation for collaboration, alliance performance, alliance stability).
The interest to strategic alliances is not only academic, because (Vyas, Shelburn, Rogers, 1995) it is crucial for a partner entering an alliance to have a thorough understanding of an alliance along with its requirements, objectives, expectations and expected benefits.
Strategic alliance stability is in the focus of this particular study. Stability of long-term cooperative decisions, and strategic alliance stability in particular, is recognized to be a fundamental problem that is studied in academic literature for the last 30 years. The problem of strategic alliance stability is widely recognized not only by scholars, but also by practitioners (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a, b). The drawback of most of the researches on the topic is in viewing strategic alliance stability as a static (Jiang, Li and Gao, 2008) and one-dimensional concept (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a), while relationships between partners in an alliance are certainly dynamic, and managing this dynamics is challenging (Douma et. al. 2000; Buffenoir, Bourdon, 2013).
Problem statement. Many issues related to strategic alliance stability remain arguable. On the one hand, strategic alliance stability is well studied in game theory as a part of cooperative decisions stability (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a,b). On the other hand, there has been a significant number of attempts to study strategic alliance stability determinants, e.g., trust, partners’ goal congruence, governance mechanisms (Jiang, Li and Gao, 2008; Deitz et al, 2010; Christoffersen, Plenborg and Robson, 2014; Isidor et al, 2015; Qing, Zhang, 2015). However, many of those studies show contradictory results due to different reasons, in particular, because the concept of strategic alliance stability lacks precision (Jiang, Li and Gao, 2008). Moreover, there is a scarcity of papers to provide managers with a comprehensive tool for strategic alliance stability management.
This research contributes to the field by attempting to identify relationships between strategic alliances stability and its factors, connecting the two fields of studies: game theory and resource-advantage theory. Viewing the problem from a game theory perspective, the research adopts a strategic alliance stability definition and conceptualization provided by Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova (2014a). On another hand, the paper contributes to a series of studies dedicated to identify strategic alliance stability factors using resource-advantage theory.
Academic studies on strategic alliances have been carried out for at least 50 years with the past 30 years being the most intense (Umukoroa, Sulaimonb and Kuyeb, 2009). The earliest studies on strategic alliances include (Friedmann and Kalmanoff, 1961; Franko, 1971). With the passage of time, along with strategic alliances growing prevalence, the studies on strategic alliances were progressing from the most broad to increasingly specific, addressing specific types of alliances (e.g., joint ventures, international joint ventures, non-equity alliances, international strategic alliances) and specific issues in alliances (e.g., motivation for collaboration, alliance performance, alliance stability).
The interest to strategic alliances is not only academic, because (Vyas, Shelburn, Rogers, 1995) it is crucial for a partner entering an alliance to have a thorough understanding of an alliance along with its requirements, objectives, expectations and expected benefits.
Strategic alliance stability is in the focus of this particular study. Stability of long-term cooperative decisions, and strategic alliance stability in particular, is recognized to be a fundamental problem that is studied in academic literature for the last 30 years. The problem of strategic alliance stability is widely recognized not only by scholars, but also by practitioners (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a, b). The drawback of most of the researches on the topic is in viewing strategic alliance stability as a static (Jiang, Li and Gao, 2008) and one-dimensional concept (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a), while relationships between partners in an alliance are certainly dynamic, and managing this dynamics is challenging (Douma et. al. 2000; Buffenoir, Bourdon, 2013).
Problem statement. Many issues related to strategic alliance stability remain arguable. On the one hand, strategic alliance stability is well studied in game theory as a part of cooperative decisions stability (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a,b). On the other hand, there has been a significant number of attempts to study strategic alliance stability determinants, e.g., trust, partners’ goal congruence, governance mechanisms (Jiang, Li and Gao, 2008; Deitz et al, 2010; Christoffersen, Plenborg and Robson, 2014; Isidor et al, 2015; Qing, Zhang, 2015). However, many of those studies show contradictory results due to different reasons, in particular, because the concept of strategic alliance stability lacks precision (Jiang, Li and Gao, 2008). Moreover, there is a scarcity of papers to provide managers with a comprehensive tool for strategic alliance stability management.
This research contributes to the field by attempting to identify relationships between strategic alliances stability and its factors, connecting the two fields of studies: game theory and resource-advantage theory. Viewing the problem from a game theory perspective, the research adopts a strategic alliance stability definition and conceptualization provided by Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova (2014a). On another hand, the paper contributes to a series of studies dedicated to identify strategic alliance stability factors using resource-advantage theory.
Research goal and objectives. During this study, the research goal, formulated in the Introduction, was reached through covering research objectives, also stated in the Introduction part. During the research, a set of relationships between strategic alliance stability and inter- organizational SAS factors were identified. This goal was attained by (1) defining the term of strategic alliance stability as a result of extensive literature analysis, then (2) developing a conceptual model of strategic alliance stability factors and (3) conducting an empirical study to test relationships between SAS factors and stability components in order to make conclusions about these relationships.
Answers to research questions. The study was aimed at answering two research questions in order to fulfill research objectives. The empirical study has provided answers to them.
RQ1: What are the relationships between strategic alliance stability inter-organizational
factors and different components of strategic alliance stability?
The research has provided insights for the issue of SAS factors. The study has differentiated between two stability components: external and internal stability, which corresponds to the game theory strategic alliance conceptualization and seems to be an all-inclusive approach. A number of SAS determinants were chosen from previous academic studies, both conceptual and empirical, for further analysis. The approach chosen to define SAS factors was R-A theory as the most integrative approach to SAS factors. Factors included trust and long-term orientation and resource complementarity.
Speaking of direct relationships, results for external stability have shown that long-term orientation of partners plays an important role in defining external SAS, while resource complementarity is an insignificant factor. However, results for internal SAS differ: long-term orientation becomes an insignificant factor, while trust and resource complementarity appear have a significant and positive effect on internal stability. This difference in results contradicts to theoretically hypothesized relationships and is likely to occur in the presence of both internal and external stability present the model, as each additional construct might change the set of significant relationships (Hair, 2010). At the same time, the presence if both, internal and external stability, has to be considered in the SAS factors model as all the stability components have to be present in order for an alliance to be overall stable (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a).
Moreover, there is a significant causal relationship between external stability and internal stability. Hence, it was empirically proven that SAS components are not independent from each
80
other. This finding is especially important in the light of SAS concept understanding and further practical applications, which are hindered by the concept current misspecifications, as described in Chapter 1.
Answers to research questions. The study was aimed at answering two research questions in order to fulfill research objectives. The empirical study has provided answers to them.
RQ1: What are the relationships between strategic alliance stability inter-organizational
factors and different components of strategic alliance stability?
The research has provided insights for the issue of SAS factors. The study has differentiated between two stability components: external and internal stability, which corresponds to the game theory strategic alliance conceptualization and seems to be an all-inclusive approach. A number of SAS determinants were chosen from previous academic studies, both conceptual and empirical, for further analysis. The approach chosen to define SAS factors was R-A theory as the most integrative approach to SAS factors. Factors included trust and long-term orientation and resource complementarity.
Speaking of direct relationships, results for external stability have shown that long-term orientation of partners plays an important role in defining external SAS, while resource complementarity is an insignificant factor. However, results for internal SAS differ: long-term orientation becomes an insignificant factor, while trust and resource complementarity appear have a significant and positive effect on internal stability. This difference in results contradicts to theoretically hypothesized relationships and is likely to occur in the presence of both internal and external stability present the model, as each additional construct might change the set of significant relationships (Hair, 2010). At the same time, the presence if both, internal and external stability, has to be considered in the SAS factors model as all the stability components have to be present in order for an alliance to be overall stable (Zenkevich, Koroleva, Mamedova, 2014a).
Moreover, there is a significant causal relationship between external stability and internal stability. Hence, it was empirically proven that SAS components are not independent from each
80
other. This finding is especially important in the light of SAS concept understanding and further practical applications, which are hindered by the concept current misspecifications, as described in Chapter 1.



