NEW DRIVING FORCES IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AS A CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA'S UNIQUE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE REGION
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Introduction 5
Originality and Methodology 7
Literature Review 11
Chapter 1: The Historical Backdrop of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 13
1.1. History of Nagorno-Karabakh: 1876 - 2020 13
1.2. Eurasia vs. Euro-Atlantic in the Early Karabakh Peace Process 1991-1994 24
1.3. Russian-Led Interwar Negotiations and the Return of Full-Scale Violence 31
1.4. The Second Karabakh War, Causes and Aftermath 35
Chapter 2: A Comparative Analysis of Other Post-Soviet Conflicts and Russian Foreign Policy .... 50
2.1. The Case of South Ossetia 50
2.2. The Case of Transdniestria 52
2.3. Common Factors and Fundamental Differences 53
Chapter 3: Current and Future Challenges: Nagorno-Karabakh and Regional Powers 55
3.1. Russian Political Maneuverability and Ongoing Challenges 55
3.2. Demarcation of Borders and Competing Monitors 59
3.4 Regional Cooperation Through Shared Challenges 67
Conclusion 74
References 77
Originality and Methodology 7
Literature Review 11
Chapter 1: The Historical Backdrop of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 13
1.1. History of Nagorno-Karabakh: 1876 - 2020 13
1.2. Eurasia vs. Euro-Atlantic in the Early Karabakh Peace Process 1991-1994 24
1.3. Russian-Led Interwar Negotiations and the Return of Full-Scale Violence 31
1.4. The Second Karabakh War, Causes and Aftermath 35
Chapter 2: A Comparative Analysis of Other Post-Soviet Conflicts and Russian Foreign Policy .... 50
2.1. The Case of South Ossetia 50
2.2. The Case of Transdniestria 52
2.3. Common Factors and Fundamental Differences 53
Chapter 3: Current and Future Challenges: Nagorno-Karabakh and Regional Powers 55
3.1. Russian Political Maneuverability and Ongoing Challenges 55
3.2. Demarcation of Borders and Competing Monitors 59
3.4 Regional Cooperation Through Shared Challenges 67
Conclusion 74
References 77
In the years leading up to and following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, numerous armed conflicts broke out in regions seeking autonomy or independence in the myriad former Soviet republics which had regained national sovereignty. Under the liberalizing policies of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost reformation programs, ethnic resentments and grievances which had been actively repressed by the extensive Soviet state security apparatus and egalitarian socialist rhetoric regarding the ‘brotherhood of nations’ erupted into fully inflamed nationalist movements and calls for self-determination across the vast superstate. Though the constitution of the Soviet Union in theory recognized the individual republics as sovereign and permitted them to leave the Union if they so choose, in practice this was a more difficult task, and often resulted in bloodshed.1 Further complicating the matter was the status of autonomous regions within the republics themselves. Among the most troubled regions where this tension of selfdetermination and territorial integrity came into play in a highly visceral and emotive manner is the South Caucasus.
The South Caucasus region, a mountainous wedge of land between two immense seas of tremendous strategic importance at the intersection of Europe and Asia, has been inhabited by as many as two-hundred highly varied ethnicities and civilizations for millennia, its history largely shaped by the great empires with which it had become entangled, namely the Russians, Persians and Ottomans. The collapse of the great empires at the dawn of the twentieth century resulted in conflicting attempts at unity and carving of national boundaries among the three great South Caucasian civilizations - namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - and numerous ethnic conflicts, massacres, and deportations occurred as a result.
Nagorno-Karabakh, translated literally as ‘Mountainous Karabakh’ is a sub-region of greater Karabakh, a sparsely vegetated South Caucasus plateau within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. During the Soviet epoch, the mountainous highland portion of Karabakh, which was largely populated by ethnic Armenians but contained significant minorities of Azeris and Russians, was provided regional autonomy as the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR), one of the fifteen constituent, officially ‘sovereign’ republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nagorno- Karabakh had faced ethnic troubles even before the Soviet period.
The Nagorno-Karabakh region is of great importance to neorealist international relations studies, as it contains the perfect conditions for an analysis of the dynamics of balances of power due to the three great powers which surround it, in addition to conflicting jurisprudence regarding the seemingly conflicting values of national self-determination and the right to territorial integrity. The Armenians who form the majority population of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh (whose borders roughly correspond to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh) claim the right to self-determination in accordance with United Nations Charter Article 1(2) and 55, which states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”2 Meanwhile, the Azeris claim a right to territorial integrity, which is outlined in United Nations Charter article 2(4), stating “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”3 Located at the crossroads of three great civilizations - that of Russia, Iran and Turkey, the resource rich region - particularly the Caspian oil fields of Baku - have been a source of envy for great powers in the immediate neighborhood and as far afield as Western Europe and the United States of America.
The British Empire briefly occupied the Azeri capital during the early twentieth century, and a key goal of the Wehrmacht’s eastern drive into the Soviet Union was to secure the Baku oil fields for the war effort. The European Union has expressed interest in providing international investment in the construction of infrastructure necessary to maximize alternative sources of energy, to reduce the dependency of central European states on Russian natural gas, particularly in the aftermath of the launch of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022. This, coupled with the increase in western economic sanctions due to the Special Military Operation has affected the balance of power in the region. NATO member Turkey has grown increasingly supportive of Azerbaijan as an indispensable arm of its pan-Turkic ambitions, while Iran has become increasingly open to collaboration with Russia due to shared grievances over western sanctions and a shared desire to seek alternative modes of trade to circumnavigate such restrictions. Therefore, the current driving forces of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict rest heavily on the economic and security interests of the three great powers which surround the region more so than policies pursued by Armenia or Azerbaijan themselves.
The South Caucasus region, a mountainous wedge of land between two immense seas of tremendous strategic importance at the intersection of Europe and Asia, has been inhabited by as many as two-hundred highly varied ethnicities and civilizations for millennia, its history largely shaped by the great empires with which it had become entangled, namely the Russians, Persians and Ottomans. The collapse of the great empires at the dawn of the twentieth century resulted in conflicting attempts at unity and carving of national boundaries among the three great South Caucasian civilizations - namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - and numerous ethnic conflicts, massacres, and deportations occurred as a result.
Nagorno-Karabakh, translated literally as ‘Mountainous Karabakh’ is a sub-region of greater Karabakh, a sparsely vegetated South Caucasus plateau within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. During the Soviet epoch, the mountainous highland portion of Karabakh, which was largely populated by ethnic Armenians but contained significant minorities of Azeris and Russians, was provided regional autonomy as the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR), one of the fifteen constituent, officially ‘sovereign’ republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nagorno- Karabakh had faced ethnic troubles even before the Soviet period.
The Nagorno-Karabakh region is of great importance to neorealist international relations studies, as it contains the perfect conditions for an analysis of the dynamics of balances of power due to the three great powers which surround it, in addition to conflicting jurisprudence regarding the seemingly conflicting values of national self-determination and the right to territorial integrity. The Armenians who form the majority population of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh (whose borders roughly correspond to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh) claim the right to self-determination in accordance with United Nations Charter Article 1(2) and 55, which states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”2 Meanwhile, the Azeris claim a right to territorial integrity, which is outlined in United Nations Charter article 2(4), stating “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”3 Located at the crossroads of three great civilizations - that of Russia, Iran and Turkey, the resource rich region - particularly the Caspian oil fields of Baku - have been a source of envy for great powers in the immediate neighborhood and as far afield as Western Europe and the United States of America.
The British Empire briefly occupied the Azeri capital during the early twentieth century, and a key goal of the Wehrmacht’s eastern drive into the Soviet Union was to secure the Baku oil fields for the war effort. The European Union has expressed interest in providing international investment in the construction of infrastructure necessary to maximize alternative sources of energy, to reduce the dependency of central European states on Russian natural gas, particularly in the aftermath of the launch of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022. This, coupled with the increase in western economic sanctions due to the Special Military Operation has affected the balance of power in the region. NATO member Turkey has grown increasingly supportive of Azerbaijan as an indispensable arm of its pan-Turkic ambitions, while Iran has become increasingly open to collaboration with Russia due to shared grievances over western sanctions and a shared desire to seek alternative modes of trade to circumnavigate such restrictions. Therefore, the current driving forces of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict rest heavily on the economic and security interests of the three great powers which surround the region more so than policies pursued by Armenia or Azerbaijan themselves.
The results of the research contained in this study indicate that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis serves as a microcosm of the geopolitical challenges facing Russia in the twenty first century. Russia’s increased isolation because of NATO encirclement and western economic pressures has incentivized it to take an extremely cautious approach towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, to maintain both its capability of power projection in the remaining areas of the Russian near- abroad where it still possesses a preeminent geopolitical role, and to build new avenues of economic development outside western Euro-Atlantic institutions. The continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis serves as a stumbling block to this end. Regional economic projects including the International North-South Transport Corridor, the Persian Gulf - Black Sea Corridor and the Rasht-Astara Railway cannot be fully realized to their maximum potential if the specter of instability is an ever-present, real threat. However, in aiming to maintain its capabilities of power projection while minimizing the risk of regional instability, Russia cannot risk alienating Armenia, a historically staunch ally, by simply withdrawing its peacekeeping forces upon Azerbaijan’s request without a negotiated final settlement, to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe if the remaining area of Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh falls entirely under Azeri control with no provision for local autonomy. The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept, with its emphasis on multipolarity, very likely will serve as a basis for the creation of a Russo-Iranian sphere of influence as Russia aims to disentangle itself socioeconomically from the west, and any form of western-style liberal institutionalism. Tehran and Moscow, having a broad range of shared conflicts with the west, find ever-more reasons to cooperate with each other.
Turkey, under the helm of President Erdogan, will continue to serve as a full-throated benefactor of Azeri interests in the region. The rhetoric of ‘one country, two states’ retains its salience. Turkish policymakers understand that Armenia’s only feasible security guarantor is Russia, however fragile said security is in reality. They likewise understand that Russia, having been isolated from the western world, will be more willing to make compromises with other regional powers surrounding the Caucasus to maintain the remaining influence it has in its near-abroad. This necessarily would include avoiding policies that alienate Turkey, a NATO member state. This means that Armenia’s protection from Turkish power plays is not formidable. Turkey, working in tandem with Azerbaijan, is likely capable of pressuring Russia to use its leverage over Armenia to make Yerevan concede to the establishment of the Zangezur corridor, finally establishing a concrete trans-Caucasian route for Turkey to extend its political and economic reach directly to the Caspian Sea and into Central Asia. Further into the future, this could lead to conflict with Russia, who views the former Soviet states of Central Asia as integral parts of the Russian near-abroad.
Iran has sought to further integrate its economic policy with that of Russia, having found common cause in seeking to work around systematic western economic sanctions, in addition to dissuading the west and its organs (NATO, the European Union) from penetrating deeper into the vicinity of its northern border. Furthermore, Iran faces the question of how to keep its large northern Azeri population from being mobilized by Azerbaijan proper into making attempts at secession, or forming a fifth column within its borders. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a visceral issue for Iran, as munitions during armed exchanges have landed within its sovereign territory, placing its own citizens and national security at risk. However, Iran is seeking to engage with Azerbaijan on regional transport infrastructure that does not conflict with Iranian interests, including the construction of border crossings and railway lines. Iran is skeptical of Turkish intentions in the region, and remains opposed to the creation of the Zangezur corridor, which could cut Iran off from the core of Armenia, a key ally in the region, and deprive it of the much needed income from Azeri transit between Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan proper. The development of alternative trade routes in the region have incentivized Iran to invest more resources into its Caspian Sea trading infrastructure. The International North-South Transport Corridor, if fully developed and utilized, can serve as an economic lifeline for Iran, and make the challenges posed by western economic sanctions increasingly negligible. However, a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the only way in which this potential can be maximized.
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Turkey, under the helm of President Erdogan, will continue to serve as a full-throated benefactor of Azeri interests in the region. The rhetoric of ‘one country, two states’ retains its salience. Turkish policymakers understand that Armenia’s only feasible security guarantor is Russia, however fragile said security is in reality. They likewise understand that Russia, having been isolated from the western world, will be more willing to make compromises with other regional powers surrounding the Caucasus to maintain the remaining influence it has in its near-abroad. This necessarily would include avoiding policies that alienate Turkey, a NATO member state. This means that Armenia’s protection from Turkish power plays is not formidable. Turkey, working in tandem with Azerbaijan, is likely capable of pressuring Russia to use its leverage over Armenia to make Yerevan concede to the establishment of the Zangezur corridor, finally establishing a concrete trans-Caucasian route for Turkey to extend its political and economic reach directly to the Caspian Sea and into Central Asia. Further into the future, this could lead to conflict with Russia, who views the former Soviet states of Central Asia as integral parts of the Russian near-abroad.
Iran has sought to further integrate its economic policy with that of Russia, having found common cause in seeking to work around systematic western economic sanctions, in addition to dissuading the west and its organs (NATO, the European Union) from penetrating deeper into the vicinity of its northern border. Furthermore, Iran faces the question of how to keep its large northern Azeri population from being mobilized by Azerbaijan proper into making attempts at secession, or forming a fifth column within its borders. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a visceral issue for Iran, as munitions during armed exchanges have landed within its sovereign territory, placing its own citizens and national security at risk. However, Iran is seeking to engage with Azerbaijan on regional transport infrastructure that does not conflict with Iranian interests, including the construction of border crossings and railway lines. Iran is skeptical of Turkish intentions in the region, and remains opposed to the creation of the Zangezur corridor, which could cut Iran off from the core of Armenia, a key ally in the region, and deprive it of the much needed income from Azeri transit between Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan proper. The development of alternative trade routes in the region have incentivized Iran to invest more resources into its Caspian Sea trading infrastructure. The International North-South Transport Corridor, if fully developed and utilized, can serve as an economic lifeline for Iran, and make the challenges posed by western economic sanctions increasingly negligible. However, a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the only way in which this potential can be maximized.
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