The Republic of South Africa in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime (1991-2022)
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Introduction 3
CHAPTER 1. South Africa’s Accession to NPT Regime: Tasks, Challenges and Opportunities (1991-1995) 11
1.1. Preparing for j oining NPT 11
1.2. Accession to NPT: domestication of non-proliferation norms and preparation
for 1995 NPT Review Conference 13
1.3. Going back on the track with IAEA 17
1.4. Managing Non-Proliferation and Export Control risks 21
1.5. Concept of Nuclear Diplomacy 23
CHAPTER 2. South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Non-Proliferation Policy since NPT Indefinite Extension (1995-2010) 26
2.1. NPT Review Process 27
2.2. Establishment and further development of ANWFZ 36
2.3. Relations with IAEA 38
2.4. Nuclear export control regime 45
2.4.1. Legal Framework 46
2.4.2. Involvement in nuclear export control 47
CHAPTER 3. South Africa’s Nuclear Diplomacy: Global and Regional Perspectives (2010-2022) 52
3.1. Global nuclear diplomacy 52
3.2. Continental nuclear diplomacy 67
Conclusion 76
List of sources 82
A. Primary sources 82
B. Secondary Sources 89
List of abbreviations 101
Annex 103
CHAPTER 1. South Africa’s Accession to NPT Regime: Tasks, Challenges and Opportunities (1991-1995) 11
1.1. Preparing for j oining NPT 11
1.2. Accession to NPT: domestication of non-proliferation norms and preparation
for 1995 NPT Review Conference 13
1.3. Going back on the track with IAEA 17
1.4. Managing Non-Proliferation and Export Control risks 21
1.5. Concept of Nuclear Diplomacy 23
CHAPTER 2. South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Non-Proliferation Policy since NPT Indefinite Extension (1995-2010) 26
2.1. NPT Review Process 27
2.2. Establishment and further development of ANWFZ 36
2.3. Relations with IAEA 38
2.4. Nuclear export control regime 45
2.4.1. Legal Framework 46
2.4.2. Involvement in nuclear export control 47
CHAPTER 3. South Africa’s Nuclear Diplomacy: Global and Regional Perspectives (2010-2022) 52
3.1. Global nuclear diplomacy 52
3.2. Continental nuclear diplomacy 67
Conclusion 76
List of sources 82
A. Primary sources 82
B. Secondary Sources 89
List of abbreviations 101
Annex 103
The current militarization of international relations suggests that in order to become stronger states need to gain power. And nuclear weapons are the most striking symbol of this power. But what if to become stronger, a nation state may abandon this striking symbol of power it has? Although the question above sounds counterintuitive, that is exactly what happened to the South African Republic.
South Africa has one of the largest uranium reserves in the world. South Africa's interest in nuclear energy can be traced back to the Second World War, during which an exploration of South Africa's uranium deposits was conducted at the request of the UK. South Africa’s nuclear program development began in 1957 under the aegis of “Atoms for Peace” programme. Within this programme South Africa got its first nuclear reactor, the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation (SAFARI-1). Then the peaceful atom was diverted for military purposes. Subsequently, South Africa’s nuclear program progressed rapidly with the development of at least six atomic devices by 1989. And when the Cold War was coming to an end, newly elected President of the South African Republic F.W. de Klerk terminated nuclear weapons program by 1990.
South Africa deserves special attention due to the fact that is the only country in history that managed to develop nuclear weapons and then unilaterally disarmed itself. Mention should be made of similar examples of nuclear disarmament. Namely, the nuclear disarmament of the Post-Soviet States: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Although these cases has a lot of in common with the South African case, it is important to distinguish them. The most important thing is that the governments of these Post-Soviet states, unlike South Africa, never had a political control over the nuclear weapons on their territory. In South Africa it was the Government led by the National Party that made decision to disarm.
It is necessary to emphasize that the study does not aim to determine why South Africa took that decision to disarm. This thesis rather uses South African unilateral disarmament with the following accession to the NPT as a starting point. Still it is necessary to outline the reasons for the South African disarmament in the introduction. After the South Africa’s disarmament and public announcement of its disarmament activities, many works devoted to the South African disarmament appeared. Hence, multiple factors have been proposed as explanations for South Africa's nuclear reversal: pressure from the United States and severe international sanctions;1 F.W. de Klerk’s opposition to nuclear weapons program”;2 shifts in decision-makers and advisors within the South African government;3 determination of NP-led government determination to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the African National Congress;4 changes in the security environment;5 African National Congress long-standing struggle against nuclear weapons;6 change of the political authority;7 international incentives on commercial and scientific cooperation.8
Nowadays the crisis of the system of international relations is underway while the new world order is yet to come, more likely in the form of multipolarity. And one of the consequences of this crisis, which also manifests itself in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, is that different actors and groups of actors promote their own interests and agenda in the international arena. In this connection, in the multipolar world order, the role of the middle powers, such as South Africa, is going to increase. Thus, the relevance of the topic lies in the fact that it is important to study the foreign policy of such states as South Africa, including its non-proliferation policy.
...
South Africa has one of the largest uranium reserves in the world. South Africa's interest in nuclear energy can be traced back to the Second World War, during which an exploration of South Africa's uranium deposits was conducted at the request of the UK. South Africa’s nuclear program development began in 1957 under the aegis of “Atoms for Peace” programme. Within this programme South Africa got its first nuclear reactor, the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation (SAFARI-1). Then the peaceful atom was diverted for military purposes. Subsequently, South Africa’s nuclear program progressed rapidly with the development of at least six atomic devices by 1989. And when the Cold War was coming to an end, newly elected President of the South African Republic F.W. de Klerk terminated nuclear weapons program by 1990.
South Africa deserves special attention due to the fact that is the only country in history that managed to develop nuclear weapons and then unilaterally disarmed itself. Mention should be made of similar examples of nuclear disarmament. Namely, the nuclear disarmament of the Post-Soviet States: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Although these cases has a lot of in common with the South African case, it is important to distinguish them. The most important thing is that the governments of these Post-Soviet states, unlike South Africa, never had a political control over the nuclear weapons on their territory. In South Africa it was the Government led by the National Party that made decision to disarm.
It is necessary to emphasize that the study does not aim to determine why South Africa took that decision to disarm. This thesis rather uses South African unilateral disarmament with the following accession to the NPT as a starting point. Still it is necessary to outline the reasons for the South African disarmament in the introduction. After the South Africa’s disarmament and public announcement of its disarmament activities, many works devoted to the South African disarmament appeared. Hence, multiple factors have been proposed as explanations for South Africa's nuclear reversal: pressure from the United States and severe international sanctions;1 F.W. de Klerk’s opposition to nuclear weapons program”;2 shifts in decision-makers and advisors within the South African government;3 determination of NP-led government determination to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the African National Congress;4 changes in the security environment;5 African National Congress long-standing struggle against nuclear weapons;6 change of the political authority;7 international incentives on commercial and scientific cooperation.8
Nowadays the crisis of the system of international relations is underway while the new world order is yet to come, more likely in the form of multipolarity. And one of the consequences of this crisis, which also manifests itself in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, is that different actors and groups of actors promote their own interests and agenda in the international arena. In this connection, in the multipolar world order, the role of the middle powers, such as South Africa, is going to increase. Thus, the relevance of the topic lies in the fact that it is important to study the foreign policy of such states as South Africa, including its non-proliferation policy.
...
After examining the South Africa’s non-proliferation policy within the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is possible to note the key findings that address the research question.
More than 30 years after its accession to the NPT, South Africa’s commitment to international nuclear non-proliferation norm is evident in its ratification of all the major multilateral treaties, including the NPT, the TPNW, the IAEA Safeguards and Additional Protocol, the Pelindaba Treaty and many other agreements and frameworks (see Table 1). Apart from non-material rewards, South Africa receives a lot of dividends from its membership to the NPT and the IAEA, which provide access to uranium markets and medical isotope business.
South Africa’s decision to accede to the NPT marked a significant turning point in the nuclear diplomacy. The NPT accession paved the way for South Africa to engage with the international community on matters of arms control, and eventually led to its active participation in other key regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
The division of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy to the global and the continental dimensions has become clearly noticeable from diplomatic practice. Since late 1990s, one could observe such a manifestation of the evolution of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy in the activities of diplomats. At the same time, not only researchers emphasize this feature of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy, but also practitioners and decision-makers. What is important to note, continental and global diplomacy do not have a concrete watershed. On the contrary, these two levels are closely related to each other. The intensification of efforts in one direction initiates another process, while similar processes can occur both within the global and within the continental levels. As a result, this has become one of the main principles of South Africa's nonproliferation policy, which continues to evolve.
Concerning the issue of continuance in South Africa’s non-proliferation policy, it can be concluded that South Africa’s non-proliferation policy is consistent and coherent, but not alien to change. These changes are the signs of evolution which is dictated by national interests and circumstances without a strong binding to the Presidents. During the research it has been discovered that the South African nonproliferation policy has been evolving with the desire to increase or preserve its international image and to gain non-material rewards. As Jo-Ansie van Wyk said South Africa has got the “historical gravitas”, which was strengthened by “voluntary disarmament” its NW.1 All this constitutes historical continuity of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
South Africa employed two diplomatic strategies in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, ranging from confrontation to cooperation. While engaging with NWS on a bilateral level, South Africa applied compartmentalization of nuclear-related issues and did not enter into an open confrontation with them. South Africa has repeatedly drawn the attention of the participants of the NPT regime and has developed arguments, thereby encouraging actors to pay attention to the growing crisis of the NPT regime. In the context of the crisis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, South Africa intensified its participation in the NPT Review Conferences, namely started to prepare more statements and working papers (see Table 4). Thus, the main tendency of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy within the NPT regime is the increased confrontation with NWS and enhanced cooperation with NNWS along with coalition building.
...
More than 30 years after its accession to the NPT, South Africa’s commitment to international nuclear non-proliferation norm is evident in its ratification of all the major multilateral treaties, including the NPT, the TPNW, the IAEA Safeguards and Additional Protocol, the Pelindaba Treaty and many other agreements and frameworks (see Table 1). Apart from non-material rewards, South Africa receives a lot of dividends from its membership to the NPT and the IAEA, which provide access to uranium markets and medical isotope business.
South Africa’s decision to accede to the NPT marked a significant turning point in the nuclear diplomacy. The NPT accession paved the way for South Africa to engage with the international community on matters of arms control, and eventually led to its active participation in other key regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
The division of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy to the global and the continental dimensions has become clearly noticeable from diplomatic practice. Since late 1990s, one could observe such a manifestation of the evolution of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy in the activities of diplomats. At the same time, not only researchers emphasize this feature of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy, but also practitioners and decision-makers. What is important to note, continental and global diplomacy do not have a concrete watershed. On the contrary, these two levels are closely related to each other. The intensification of efforts in one direction initiates another process, while similar processes can occur both within the global and within the continental levels. As a result, this has become one of the main principles of South Africa's nonproliferation policy, which continues to evolve.
Concerning the issue of continuance in South Africa’s non-proliferation policy, it can be concluded that South Africa’s non-proliferation policy is consistent and coherent, but not alien to change. These changes are the signs of evolution which is dictated by national interests and circumstances without a strong binding to the Presidents. During the research it has been discovered that the South African nonproliferation policy has been evolving with the desire to increase or preserve its international image and to gain non-material rewards. As Jo-Ansie van Wyk said South Africa has got the “historical gravitas”, which was strengthened by “voluntary disarmament” its NW.1 All this constitutes historical continuity of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
South Africa employed two diplomatic strategies in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, ranging from confrontation to cooperation. While engaging with NWS on a bilateral level, South Africa applied compartmentalization of nuclear-related issues and did not enter into an open confrontation with them. South Africa has repeatedly drawn the attention of the participants of the NPT regime and has developed arguments, thereby encouraging actors to pay attention to the growing crisis of the NPT regime. In the context of the crisis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, South Africa intensified its participation in the NPT Review Conferences, namely started to prepare more statements and working papers (see Table 4). Thus, the main tendency of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy within the NPT regime is the increased confrontation with NWS and enhanced cooperation with NNWS along with coalition building.
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